Essay Transcript: The Never-Ending Xinjiang Crisis

Darryl Weng, University of Southern California, 30 November 2023

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For more than a decade, the Chinese government (CCP) has instituted violent policies against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities living in the Xinjiang region. While this issue has developed since the late 20th century and eventually saw established international attention in 2017, the continued actions against ethnic minorities have become increasingly concerning as years pass with little to no progress in the changing of such policies. Although the CCP defends its policies due to supposed national security concerns and racial attacks on the Han ethnic majority, the genocidal policies against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities are an egregious violation of human rights and deeply rooted in racial discrimination. The urgency to end these policies increases every year as these violations continue to escalate without any repercussions.

Long before the CCP labeled the ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region as the cause of national security concerns, the government was already heavily engaged in sinicization. Under the University of British Columbia’s Institute of Asian Research, the Xinjiang Documentation Project detailed a timeline of CCP policies aimed against Xinjiang ethnic minorities. In 1994, the CCP built a park in the Xinjiang region to “commemorate Han conquest” of the region (XDP). Since then, Chinese authorities have taken actions to regulate the cultural identity of the ethnic minorities over fears of separation from the state. The continued sinicization may be primarily attributed to China’s adoption of a variation of the racial model developed by the Soviet Union that deals with political and ethnic stability. Munawwar Abdulla of Harvard University and Zubayra Shamseden, Vice President of the World Uyghur Congress, elaborated on the major ideals of the CCP/Soviet Union racial model. Known as the Soviet’s “model of nationality formation”, the USSR’s racial model took Stalin’s definition of nation: a state where people “have common language, hold a common region, lead a common life, and possess common mental qualities” in regards to maintaining a common culture (Abdulla and Shamseden). China mimics this model through its Han ethnic majority, enforcing Han-Chinese culture and values whilst also suppressing beliefs not consistent with the ethnic majority. China’s model also includes systems of hierarchy such as classifications of minzu (term for ethnicities) and labeling of civilized vs. uncivilized. Much like its Soviet counterpart, the CCP’s racial model maintains many “Cold War era theories such as foreign intervention” and “irredentist disputes” (Abdulla and Shamseden).

Under the CCP’s racial model, China’s sinicization is primarily a political tool to create stability and unification. But China’s sinicization in the Xinjiang region specifically is also rooted in economic beliefs. Sadia Rahman and Wei-En Tan of Trames, a journal on humanities and social sciences, detailed the two-faced approach by China in its diplomacy and policies against Uyghurs (Rahman and Tan). While supposedly focused on human rights, China’s human rights diplomacy on Uyghurs is grounded in the idea of economic prosperity for all, much like the ideals of China’s racial model where there is a common goal among all individuals. But, through the idea of economic prosperity, China fundamentally believes the economic status of the ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region may be uplifted to the standards of that of the Han ethnic majority through forced assimilation of muslims into the Han culture ( Rahman and Tan). Even more so, China is also concentrating on the Xinjiang region for economic growth and resource opportunities. Raina Zhao of the University of California, Berkeley wrote in the Berkeley Economic Review that the China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a primary cause for the government’s repression of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities (Zhao). BRI is a major infrastructure project that runs through the Xinjiang region and aims to create an economic zone in both the regions of Eurasia and the majority of the Middle East. Due to the value and potential of BRI, China has invested heavily in the Xinjiang region to maximize efficiency, effectiveness, and growth of BRI. The Xinjiang region is a strategic location due to key routes. Accusing those in the region of lawlessness and separatist beliefs, the Chinese government may use greater leverage in operating in the region due to its autonomy (Zhao).

By adopting policies to pursue the ideals of its racial model of national stability and achieve political and economic gain, China has caused decades-long ethnic and racial tensions in the Xinjiang region. Beginning in 1997 and increasing in severity throughout 2007-2015, forced closures of mazar festivals and local cultural landmarks were a few of the many tactics set out by the CCP to eliminate any pro-separatist sentiment through the eradication of Islamic faith (XDP). But extremist groups arose as a result of such tactics. Chinese authorities blamed terrorist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement for attacks on the nation (later revealed that the group did not exist then), attributing a small minority of individuals in the Xinjiang region to the entirety of ethnic minority groups such as Uyghurs. As a result, the CCP executed even more extreme policies and actions in the name of national security concerns. Bozhen Zhang, a graduate student at the University of Oxford at the time of his publication, published in the Islamophobia Studies Journal a review on China’s treatment of Islamic and Muslim minority groups and concluded that the national security concerns were primarily the cause of such treatment rather than anti-Islam and racial/ethnic beliefs (Zhang). Zhang elaborates on two categories of the Muslim minority groups: 1. Hui Muslims 2. Uyghur Muslims. The Hui Muslims are regarded to be more sinicized and therefore a less of a threat to separatist concerns, which gave Hui more religious freedom than Uyghurs through the CCP’s ethnic minority policies (Zhang). The policies, according to Zhang, are a reaction to separatist ideals and promotion of ethnic harmony as the Hui have assimilated more to the Han culture and values than Uyghurs. Zhang also responds to criticism of such policies by expressing the impossibility of a “one-size-fits-all” policy - labeling the criticisms and anger as misunderstandings. Yet the publication fails to address the events in the years following 2001, despite being published in 2022. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the CCP “[justified] its actions towards Uyghurs as a part of the Global War on Terrorism” (Maizland). This gave way for authorities to self-justify their escalation into murderous behavior: the 2009 protest in Xinjiang’s capital by Uyghur demonstrators against “state-incentivized Han Chinese migration in the region” resulted in “nearly two hundred people” slaughtered (Maizland). The actions taken by the CCP can no longer be justified under the explanation of China’s policies by Zhang. The attributing of an overwhelming minority of the Xinjiang region ethnic groups to terrorism along with the CCP being responsible for genocide is not justified under or a result of so-called national security and separatist concerns. These actions have been undertaken as a direct result from China’s application of its racial model and growing political and economic gains from the Xinjiang region. Initially, the issue concerning the actions of Chinese authority was state-wide racial and ethnic discrimination - an international violation of civil rights. Now the issue has quickly escalated into a genocide crisis spanning across territory nearly a sixth of China’s size.

After decades being largely unnoticed by the international community, in 2017, the CCP began the internationally-condemned mass detention of all the ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region. The following year, Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the human rights issue in China, addressing the mass detention. In his report, Busby highlighted that “Chinese authorities have detained at least 800,000, and possibly more than 2 million, Uighurs and members of other Muslim minorities in internment camps for indefinite periods of time”. Busby elaborates further and reveals that the families of those in internment camps “lack information about their whereabouts, their well-being, and for how long they will be held” (Busby). In this modern era, China has managed to wipe away nearly all human rights from millions without any consequences. From killing hundreds of protestors to detaining a large, unidentifiable number of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, China has rapidly escalated its genocidal policies without any slow-down from mass-wide, international condemnation. The responses from the international community to the CCP’s policies have not alleviated the Xinjiang crisis at all. In August of 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stepped into the fray and released a report on the crisis. The report cross-examines many of the CCP’s claims and statements regarding the policies and actions taken in the Xinjiang region. For example, OHCHR’s report mentions the treatment of detainees in the internment camp facilities through the accounts of former detainees vs. the authorities in charge of the facilities. Accounts mention harsh treatment such as baton beating, “tiger chair” electronic baton torture, sexual violence including rape, interrogation through water suffocation, lengthy solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, 24/7 surveillance, prevention of speaking non-Han Chinese language, culture, and religion, and forced pro-CCP songs repeated till physical pain (OHCHR).

While the OHCHR reaches deep into condemning the human rights abuse by the Chinese government, the UN has failed to place legal charges on the government and left out mentions of genocide. Lauren Baillie and Matthew Parkes of the United States Institute of Peace reviewed the OHCHR report, highlighting that “many observers were critical of the quiet, last-minute release”. The head of OHCHR, High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet and successor Volker Turk, decided to use a “quiet diplomatic approach, rather than public condemnations and accountability efforts” (Baillie and Parkes). Baillie and Parkes reason that Beijing maintains strong influence over the UN’s decision making. For example, being one of the five original and permanent members of the UN security council, China’s single vote to dissent on any subject invalidates any motion forwarded to the council. More shockingly, many member states of the UN such as Qatar, Indonesia, and United Arab Emirates - all members of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation - rejected the motion to allow for an international debate on the Xinjiang crisis due to strong ties with Beijing (Baillie and Parkes).

Not only does China have great influence on the UN’s decision making, but, by being a world power both economically and politically, China wields immense influence over the opinions and decision making of other countries. Recall the events unfolding during China’s takeover of Hong Kong from its relatively political autonomy to complete CCP governance. From 2018-2019, Hong Kong lit up with protests after China attempted to usurp the political autonomy of Hong Kong, pulling the Hong Kongese into communist rule. Hong Kong’s Beijing-backed leader Carrie Lam caused widespread anger, resulting in mass protests. The fortune that Hong Kong amassed turned around and depleted at an incredible rate. The protests combined legislative efforts and community outreach efforts to engage the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Newspapers, media outlets, petitioners, and demonstrators came together to coordinate protests in a peaceful manner. Sadly, the protests dwindled after mass arresting, injuring, beatings, and other cruel practices by the government. Even international bounties were created for demonstration leaders and major figures. As demonstrations attempted to address police brutality during the protests, the police escalated their physical violence. The government even went as far as to hire undercover agents and actors to engage in violent behavior as publicity against the protests (Shek). In both cases - the Hong Kong protests and the racial/ethnic CCP policies - Chinese authorities utilized their political power to suppress the efforts of its victims through violent means. Even worse, in both cases, there was no international intervention. The only case of aid in the Hong Kong protests were efforts by countries such as the U.S, Canada, and United Kingdom to offer visas for those seeking asylum from the encroaching Chinese authorities (Shek). As for the ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region, seeking asylum is unattainable as trying to leave the region under heavy surveillance, restrictions, regulations, and military order is both risky and nearly impossible. The genocidal policies against ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region is only one of many actions taken by the CCP that has faced little to no international aid and faced zero repercussions.

The lack of political power the UN has over international humanitarian issues such as China’s ethnic minority policies is extremely concerning due to the UN being the only official international policing body to perform checks on sovereign countries from violating international agreements, human rights, and peace. At the same time, China’s position as an influential nation in the global economy and politics threatens the international standard of human rights. While the U.S has been the primary and most dominant critic of China’s policies, the actions implemented to curtail China’s ability to freely abuse the Xinjiang region have been minimal and ineffective. There is no known solution to halt China’s genocidal policies and violence, but efforts must continue and increase in effectiveness.

Works Cited

Abdulla, Munawwar, and Zubayra Shamseden. “The Rise of Xenophobia and the Uyghur-China Situation.” The Commons, vol. 88, no. 4, 2021, pp. 949-972.

Baillie, Lauren, and Matthew Parkes. “Don't Look Away from China's Atrocities Against the Uyghurs.” United States Institute of Peace, 6 April 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/dont-look-away-chinas-atrocities-against-uyghurs. Accessed 30 November 2023.

Busby, Scott. “Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby.” U.S Senate, 16 June 2023, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2023.

“Cultural Destruction Timeline - Xinjiang Documentation Project.” Xinjiang Documentation Project, https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/timelines/cultural-destruction-timeline/. Accessed 30 November 2023.

Maizland, Lindsay. “China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.” Council on Foreign Relations, 22 September 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights#chapter-title-0-5. Accessed 30 November 2023.

Rahman, Sadia, and Wei-En Tan. “CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY AND THE UYGHUR CRACKDOWN: THE APPEARANCE OF CONSISTENCY AND THE REALITY OF CONTRADICTION. CHINA'S DOUBLE STANDARDS IN HUMAN RIGHTS.” Trames, vol. 26, no. 1, 2022, pp. 25-56.

Shek, Daniel TL. “Protests in Hong Kong (2019–2020): a Perspective Based on Quality of Life and Well-Being.” NCBI, 13 March 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7088818/. Accessed 30 November 2023.

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China.” OHCHR, 31 August 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2023.

Zhang, Bozhen. “An Analysis of China’s Muslim-Related Policies from the Perspectives of Ethnic Heterogeneity, Sinicization and “Anxiety Management.”” Islamophobia Studies Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, 2022, pp. 45-55.

Zhao, Raina. “Persecution for Profit: China's Economic Strategy in Xinjiang.” Berkeley Economic Review, 22 October 2019, https://econreview.berkeley.edu/persecution-for-profit-chinas-economic-strategy-in-xinjiang/. Accessed 30 November 2023.